University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2004

Pipeline Gathering in an Unbundled World: How
FERC's Response to "Spin Down" Threatens
Competition in the Natural Gas Industry
David V. Bryce

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bryce, David V., "Pipeline Gathering in an Unbundled World: How FERC's Response to "Spin Down" Threatens Competition in the
Natural Gas Industry" (2004). Minnesota Law Review. 667.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/667

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Pipeline Gathering in an Unbundled World:
How FERC's Response to "Spin Down" Threatens
Competition in the Natural Gas Industry
David V. Bryce*
Motivated by fears that interstate pipeline companies engaged in profit gouging and other unsavory monopolistic practices, Congress in 1938 passed the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to
protect consumers from excessive gas rates.' The Act mandated
"just and reasonable" rates for all jurisdictional gas services,
declaring that the natural gas industry was "affected with a
public interest."2 To ensure just rates, the NGA empowered the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) to regulate the interstate
sale and transportation of natural gas and to ensure that companies did not abandon facilities dedicated to interstate gas
markets without prior approval from the FPC.3 Significantly,
and gathering of
the Act specifically exempted the production
4
natural gas from federal regulation.
Initially, the FPC pursued its statutory ends by enabling
pipeline companies to perform all the actions needed to bring
gas to market, with purchasers required to pay a single contract price for these "bundled services." 5 Minimum competition
existed in the interstate gas market, with given markets and
pipeline companies mutually bound to one another. 6 This regulatory regime of bundled services and minimal interstate com* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1992,
University of Michigan.
1. See Joseph Fagan, From Regulation to Deregulation: The Diminishing
Role of the Small Consumer Within the Natural Gas Industry, 29 TULSA L.J.
707, 711-12 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(a), 717c(a) (2000).
3. See id. §§ 717(b), 717f(b).
4. Id. § 717(b).
5. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1343-46 (1998).
6. See id.
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petition remained unchanged until the energy crisis of the
1970s spurred Congress to pass the Natural Gas Policy Act, deregulating many wellhead gas prices, and replacing the FPC
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 7
Since its inception, FERC has attempted to inject competition into the natural gas industry.8 In pursuit of competition,
FERC mandated open access to pipeline transportation facilities and required the unbundling of gas services. 9 Open access
forced pipelines to make their transportation services available
to any producer of gas, for the first time enabling end users to
purchase gas directly from the wellhead. 10 Coming on the heels
of open access initiatives, unbundling required pipelines to
make each of their gas services available to purchasers at individual prices.11 Purchasers no longer were required to buy a
package of services from the pipelines. Instead, they could
match individual services to their specific needs, thus forcing
pipelines to compete with independent producers and gatherers
12
of natural gas.
Generally, competition created by unbundling and open access has the effect of lowering prices.13 Not all of FERC's policies, however, are consistent with its procompetitive agenda.
Specifically, FERC's liberal policy toward deregulating pipeline
gathering facilities once they are transferred to a wholly owned
affiliate presents pipelines with fresh avenues of regulatory arbitrage and new means of reestablishing monopoly power in
certain gas markets.
Despite the NGA's exemption of gathering from federal
regulation, FERC asserted jurisdiction over many pipeline
gathering facilities because the gas they gathered directly entered the flow of interstate commerce. 14 By requiring pipelines
7. See id.
8. Id. at 1344 ('The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
which in 1977 succeeded to the jurisdiction of the former Federal Power Commission... issued a series of orders designed to... stimulate competition.").
9. Paul Turner, Natural Gas Bypass and the Antitrust Laws in a Brave
New (Post OrderNo. 636) World, 82 VA. L. REv. 1021, 1028-30 (1996).
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1030.
12. Id.
13. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED
INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 341-46 (3d. ed. 1994) (discussing the desirable and

undesirable effects that unbundling and open access have on various regulated
markets).
14. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954)
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to offer their gathering services on an individual basis, however, unbundling forced pipelines to compete with independent
nonregulated gatherers. 15 In response, pipelines began abandoning jurisdictional gathering facilities and transferring them
to wholly owned affiliates, simultaneously petitioning FERC to
classify the transferred facilities as nonjurisdictional. 16 This
process, known as "spin down," has been warmly received by
FERC, which asserts that it possesses no authority to assert jurisdiction over a transferred facility that qualifies as gathering,
and thus is not required to determine whether or not a proposed abandonment and transfer is in the public interest.1 7 Notably, FERC requires no showing that a spin down will promote
competition or that competitive conditions exist in a market
where spin down is proposed.' 8 This lack of interest in an a priori showing of competition threatens to enable pipelines to reassert the precise market dominance FERC's policies of open
access and unbundling are intended to prevent.
This Note argues that FERC should reformulate its approach to spin down requests, requiring a showing of competition in markets where spin down is proposed and exercising its
regulatory authority to conduct a public interest analysis prior
to granting abandonment requests. Part I provides a brief description of the natural gas industry prior to passage of the
NGA. Part II discusses specific provisions of the NGA, including the regulation of interstate sales, transportation, and
abandonment, as well as regulatory reliance on a system of
bundled services. Part III describes the FERC's deregulatory
initiatives, focusing on pipeline adoption of spin down in response to unbundling. Part IV discusses and analyzes responses by FERC and the courts to spin down. Part V provides
a series of recommendations, including the promotion of informational transparency within the gathering industry and the
importance of demonstrating that spin down will encourage,
rather than curtail, competition.

(holding that an intrastate gathering facility is subject to federal regulation if
the facility sells its gas to companies that will distribute it over interstate
piplines).
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 331 F.3d
1011, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
17. See id. at 1015, 1021-22.
18. Id. at 1022.
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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:537

I. THE UNREGULATED ERA
The use of gas as an energy source is deeply rooted in

American history. 19 By 1859, manufactured gas 20 illuminated

over 9000 public lamps in the cities of New York and Philadelphia. 2 1 Today, natural gas fuels the production of approximately sixteen percent of the nation's electricity, while some
experts anticipate that by the year 2020 natural gas will provide the fuel needed to generate over one-third of all electrical
22
consumption.
State involvement in the American gas industry dates to
its inception. 23 When the Gas Light Company of Baltimore became the nation's first gas company in 1816, it possessed an exclusive municipal lighting contract with the city of Baltimore. 24
Until the 1920s, ill-fated location stunted growth of the
natural gas industry. 25 Natural gas reserves were concentrated
in the Southwest, particularly Texas and Oklahoma. 26 Large
19. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. CASTANEDA, INVISIBLE FUEL:
MANUFACTURED AND NATURAL GAS IN AMERICA, 1800-2000 (1999); DAVID
HOWARD DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS 132-62 (4th ed. 1993); Robert L. Bradley,
Jr., The Distortions and Dynamics of Gas Regulation, in NEW HORIZONS IN
NATURAL GAS DEREGULATION 1 (Jerry Ellig & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1996).
20. Manufactured gas consists of energy-rich vapors resulting from the
thermal decomposition of various hydrocarbon sources including coal and oil.
ARLON R. TUSSING & CONNIE C. BARLOW, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY:
EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMICS 259 (1984). By comparison, natural
gas consists of various hydrocarbons including methane, ethane, and propane.
DAVIS, supra note 19, at 134-35. Natural gas is generated as a result of decaying animal and plant matter that takes on a gaseous state and seeps under the
earth's surface. Id. For use as fuel, natural gas must be extracted from its underground source and shipped by pipeline to its point of consumption. Id. The
advantages of natural gas over manufactured gas are significant. In comparison to coal and oil, natural gas emits virtually no pollutants, is odor free, and
available at lower prices. See id.
21. CASTANEDA, supra note 19, at 35.
22. Michael A. Stosser & Joseph H. Fagan, Natural Gas Pipelines and the
Bush Energy Plan: New Ideas or Just Politics?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
258, 258 (2002).
23. See Bradley, supra note 19, at 3. Bradley suggests that the close interrelationship of the state and the incipient gas industry in the United States
derives from the "English tradition of government charters and franchises and
public ownership of the streets." Id.
24. Id.
25. See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE NATURAL GAS MARKET: SIXTY YEARS OF
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 3 (2000) (noting that large gas reserves are
located in the Southwest with markets concentrated in the East).
26. Id. Since the location of natural gas reserves in the Southwest, dating
to the late nineteenth century, additional large scale reserves have been located in Alberta, Canada; Colorado; and New Mexico. Id.
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markets for natural gas, however, were situated miles away,
primarily on the East and West coasts. 27 For anyone interested
in entering the natural gas industry, this presented a significant problem because no reliable means of transporting natural
gas such distances existed. 28 Not until the emergence of electric
welding and high tensile steel in the 1920s did construction of
pipelines suitable for transporting gas great distances become
29
possible.
While developments in pipeline technology facilitated an
unprecedented boom in the natural gas industry, they simultaneously introduced the threat of pipeline companies exercising
monopoly control over the distribution of natural gas.30 Cities
with high demand for natural gas found themselves with no alternative but to accept the terms of service offered by the pipeline company that supplied gas to their area. 31 Further complicating this situation was the inability of states to regulate the
interstate transmission of natural gas.3 2 Individual state at-

tempts to regulate pipelines were thwarted by a series of Supreme Court decisions that held that the dormant Commerce
Clause barred states from regulating the interstate transportation of natural gas. 33 This created a regulatory void between

with
producers and customers, providing pipeline companies
34
essentially unrestrained leverage over their clients.

27.

Id.

28.

Natural gas is notoriously difficult to transport, largely due to its

gaseous state. This gaseous state generates two transportation difficulties.
First, gases typically yield low amounts of energy. Therefore, it is necessary,
absent compression, to transport great quantities in order to meet end user
demand. Second, gas, quite obviously, tends to easily escape even from the
most minutely porous storage or transportation facilities. Attempts to transport gas through pipes joined by screws typically resulted in up to forty percent loss. See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 133.
29. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1995, at 53, 53.

30. See id. (describing interstate transportation of natural gas as a natural monopoly "characterized by large economies of scale and high barriers to
entry").
31. Many major cities received natural gas supplies from a single pipeline
company. By the mid-1930s, the ten largest pipeline companies controlled
eighty-six percent of all interstate natural gas transmission. DAVIS, supra note
19, at 138.
32. See Pierce, supra note 29, at 53.
33. Id.; see Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83
(1927); Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
34. See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 140.
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To fully grasp the bargaining advantage pipeline companies possessed, one must consider the three transactional
phases that characterized the natural gas industry between the
mid-1920s and mid-1980s. In general terms, producers extracted natural gas from the earth, selling it to a pipeline company. The rate charged for this transaction, known as the "field
price," was subject to state regulation since the entire exchange
occurred within a single state. 35 The pipeline company then
transported the gas to consumer markets, most often located
across multiple state lines. 36 Once it arrived at its destination,
the pipeline sold the gas to a local distribution company
(LDC).37 States regulated rates, known as the "city gate price,"
charged for this transaction. 38 Finally, in a last transaction also
falling under state regulatory jurisdiction, the LDC resold the
gas to end users, typically residential or industrial consumers.

39

In sum, the series of transactions that occurred as gas
moved from wellhead to end user fell under the purview of
state regulation. But the critical space in between wellhead extraction and end use consumption-the transportation of gas
from the well to market-lacked regulation. This regulatory
gap led Congress to pass the NGA. 40
II. THE REGULATORY ERA
A desire to protect consumers from excessive gas rates inspired passage of the NGA.41 Congress sought to protect consumers by asserting federal jurisdiction over the interstate sale
and transportation of gas and by requiring jurisdictional facilities to obtain federal approval prior to discontinuing services. 42

35. See id.; MAcAvOY, supra note 25, at 4 (defining "field price").
36. MACAVOY, supra note 25, at 4.
37. Id.
38. See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 140; MACAVOY, supra note 25, at 4 (defining "city gate price").
39. MACAVOY, supra note 25, at 4.
40. DAVIS, supra note 19, at 140.
41. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944) ("The primary
aim of [the Natural Gas Act] was to protect consumers against exploitation at
the hands of natural gas companies.").
42. See Fagan, supra note 1, at 711-12 (explaining that Congress empowered the FPC to assert jurisdiction over the sale of gas, the transportation of
gas, and the abandonment of gas facilities).
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and gathering of
The NGA specifically exempted the production
43
regulation.
federal
natural gas from
A. FEAR OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY
Supporters of the NGA drew heavily from a 1935 Federal
Trade Commission study concluding that the natural gas pipeline industry was a natural monopoly. 44 Natural monopoly theory posits that economies of scale within certain industries enable a single firm to provide service at lower average cost than
several competing firms. 45 Where a natural monopoly exists,
failure to regulate the monopolist firm may lead to pricing
structures highly detrimental to consumers of the monopolist's
services. 4 6 Regulation becomes necessary to achieve a balance
between the monopolist service provider and4 7consumers that
roughly mimics competitive market conditions.
Critics of basing regulatory policy on concerns of natural
monopoly argue that perfectly competitive markets are not
needed to prevent firms from achieving monopoly profits. 48 Instead, the threat of competitors entering a market, coupled
with their ability to exit if profits do not materialize, offsets the
capacity of a single firm to attain monopoly profits. 49 Moreover,
natural monopolies do not exist in perpetuity. 50 Technological
developments in a given industry or modification of regulatory
51
policy may reduce or eliminate natural monopoly conditions.
Nevertheless, concern that natural monopoly defined the
gas pipeline industry featured prominently in passage of the
NGA.52 This concern stemmed directly from the Federal Trade

Commission's 1935 report concluding that the pipeline industry
possessed both monopoly and monopsony characteristics, including inflated prices, restricted availability of services, and
43.
44.

15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2000).
See Fagan, supra note 1, at 712.

45.
46.

See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982).
See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY

RATES 33-41 (2d ed.
47. See id.

1988).

48. See id. at 42-43 (discussing contestable market theory).
49. See id.
50. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
45-47 (2d ed. 1988).

51. See id.
52. See Fagan, supra note 1, at 712 (mentioning that Congress was concerned about the monopolistic characteristics of the natural gas industry and
the effect a gas monopoly would have on small residential consumers).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:537

monopoly profits at the expense of natural gas producers and

consumers. 53 Drafted against this backdrop, the NGA sought to
protect consumers from the monopolistic practices of interstate

pipelines.

54

B. A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Congress predicated its ability to regulate the natural gas
industry upon its belief "that the business of transporting and
selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest."55 The concept of regulating business in the public interest dates to the medieval period, 56 yet
precise definition of public interest regulatory standards remains elusive.57 American jurisprudence generally holds that
the public interest standard "is not a broad license to promote
the general public welfare." 58 Instead, interpretation of the
public interest must stem directly from "the purposes of the
regulatory legislation." 59 The NGA seeks to ensure a plentiful
supply of natural gas to consumers at "just and reasonable

53. See Fagan, supra note 1, at 714 n.14 ("Noting that the [natural gas
industry] contained some of the textbook features of a monopoly/monopsony
for instance, abnormally high prices, considerable accumulation of wealth at
the expense of producers and consumers, and insufficient availability of the
pipeline service, the FTC recommended that the industry be regulated."); John
Burrit McArthur, Anti-Trust in the New [De]Regulated Natural Gas Industry,
18 ENERGY L.J. 1, 7-9 (1997) (mentioning that the FTC study found a high
level of power and the potential for market abuse, which in turn led to the
regulatory controls on interstate gas transportation in the NGA).
54. Fagan, supra note 1, at 712.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2000).
56. See BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION
243-44 (1980). Mitnick describes how the concept of "just price" emerged in
the medieval period in opposition to Roman law's reliance on "natural price."
Id. at 243. Contrary to "natural price," which approved any willing exchange,
"just price" noted that certain types of exchanges might involve implicit or explicit coercion. Id. at 243-44.
57. See Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The 'Public Interest"
Standard:The Searchfor the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 ("Critics
of this public interest standard have often charged that the phrase 'is vague to
the point of vacuousness, providing neither guidance nor constraint on the
[regulatory] agency's action."' (quoting Glen 0. Robinson, Title I, The Federal
Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 at 3, 14 (Max D.
Paglin ed., 1989))).
58. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976) (holding that regulation in
the public interest, as defmed by the NGA, does not provide the FPC with a
broad directive to eliminate employment discrimination).
59. Id.
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rates."60 The public interest as embodied by the NGA, therefore, requires regulatory actions closely linked to the 6objective
1
of providing access to natural gas at reasonable prices.
C. REGULATING SALES, TRANSPORTATION, AND ABANDONMENT

1. Bundled Services and Just and Reasonable Rates
To engage in the interstate sale or transportation of natural gas, the NGA requires pipelines to first obtain a certificate
2
of public convenience and necessity from FERC.6 Moreover,
the NGA directly mandates that rates charged for the inter63
state sale of natural gas be just and reasonable with services
64
provided in a manner that is not unduly discriminatory. To
enforce these provisions, section 4 of the NGA requires jurisdic65
tional firms to file rates and conditions of service with FERC.
The just and reasonable standard of rate making aims to
protect both endusers, by assuring that rates charged fall
within a "zone of reasonableness," and providers, by assuring
66
that they can recover their investments. From its inception
until the mid-1980s, the NGA sought to balance the interests of
companies by instituting a system of
end users and pipeline
67
bundled services.
Under a system of bundled services, pipelines performed
all the actions needed to bring natural gas to market-68
gathering, processing, storing, transporting, and marketing.
Further, pipelines controlled access to transportation, owning
69
virtually all the gas that passed through their facilities. Because of this transportation monopoly, LDCs were required to
purchase gas directly from the pipelines, paying a single price
60. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) ("All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas company... shall be just and reasonable."); NAACP,
425 U.S. at 670.
61. NAACP, 425 U.S. at 669-70.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c). When reviewing a certificate application, FERC
considers the applicant's access to adequate "natural gas reserves, physical
facilities, financial resources, and market demand." PHILLIPS, supra note 50,
at 516.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a).
64.
65.
66.

See id. § 717c(b).
Id. § 717c(c).

BONBRIGHT, supra note 46, at 516.
67. Id. at 712-13.
68. McArthur, supra note 53, at 8-9.
69. Id. at 9.

546
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for bundled services. 70 The system of bundled services protected
the financial interests of pipelines by providing them with captive markets. 71 In turn, the system protected end users by requiring pipelines to submit to rate regulation in exchange for
monopoly control of a given natural gas market.7 2
2.

Regulation of Abandonment
Section 7(b) of the NGA prevents any natural gas company
from abandoning "all or any portion of its facilities subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by
means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of
the Commission." 73 Petitions for abandonment are granted
upon a showing that the "present or future public convenience
or necessity permit such abandonment."74
Section 7(b) premises its requirement that a certificate be
obtained prior to abandonment on two rationales. The first
holds that obtaining a certificate to provide service carries with
it "an obligation, deeply embedded in the law, to continue ser75
vice."

The second posits that the company seeking abandon-

ment bears the burden of demonstrating that "the public interest will in no way be disserved by abandonment."76 Evaluation
of a petition for abandonment requires adequate consideration
of "all factors relevant to an intelligent determination of the
overall public interest." 77
D. THE PRODUCTION AND GATHERING EXEMPTION

Section 1(b) of the NGA specifically exempted the production and gathering of natural gas from federal regulation.78
Production of natural gas involves locating gas sources and extracting gas from the earth.7 9 Gathering "is the process of tak-

70.

See Fagan, supra note 1, at 713.

71.
72.
73.

See id.
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (2000).

74.

Id.

75. Mich. Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
76. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. FPC, 488 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (holding that the public interest is the paramount criteria governing
abandonment and that the burden of showing that abandonment serves the
public interest rests with the petitioner).
77. Id. at 1328.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b).
79. Fagan, supra note 1, at 709.
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ing natural gas from the wells and moving it to a collection
point for further movement through a pipeline's principal
transmission system."80
Two factors led Congress to exempt production and gathering from NGA jurisdiction. First, unlike the interstate sale and
transportation of natural gas, no regulatory gap existed for
production and gathering.8 1 Prior to the NGA, states possessed
authority to regulate local production and gathering.8 2 Thus,
section 1(b)'s exemptions sought to "preserve in the States powers of regulation in areas in which the States are constitutionally competent to act."8 3 Second, again unlike the interstate
transportation of natural gas, robust competition characterizes
the production and gathering industries.8 4 With no prospect of
to place pronatural monopoly, Congress lacked justification
8 5
duction and gathering within NGA jurisdiction.
The production and gathering exemption proved easy to
theoretically state and difficult to practically apply.8 6 The
paramount challenge became how to classify whether facilities
engaged in jurisdictional transportation or nonjurisdictional
production and gathering. The NGA itself provides little guidance, defining neither "transportation" nor "production and
8 7
gathering."
Attempting to fill this definitional gap, the Supreme Court
held that "'production' and 'gathering' are terms narrowly confined to the physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth and
preparing it for the first stages of distribution."8 8 Additionally,
the Court held that "[e]xceptions to the primary grant of juris89
diction in [section 1(b)] are to be strictly construed."

80. N.W. Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 905 F.2d 1403, 1404 n.1 (10th Cir.
1990).
81. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See PHILLIPS, supra note 50, at 633.
85. See Fagan, supra note 1, at 711-13 (explaining the integral role of a
natural monopoly in the NGA's grant of jurisdiction over the transportation
and sale of natural gas to the FPC).
86. See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (discussing varied constructions of the gathering exemption and the

resultant variance in its application).
87. Id. at 1076.

88. N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 90 (1963).
89. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1947).
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Two points pertaining to these holdings bear consideration.
First, while production is easy to categorize based on purely
physical acts, this is less true where gathering is concerned. 90
Production involves extracting gas from the earth, a single
physical act. Gathering, however, requires use of a network of
small pipelines to transport gas to a collection point for further
delivery over a single line. 91 Because multiple pipelines are
used in the gathering process "[t]he line between jurisdictional
transportation and nonjurisdictional gathering is not always
92
clear."

Second, limiting section 1(b) exemptions to physical acts
extended NGA jurisdiction to rates charged for the production
and gathering of gas subsequently entering the flow of interstate commerce. 93 Production and gathering done by a company
wholly independent of an interstate pipeline and occurring on a
purely intrastate basis fell under NGA authority if the company sold its gas to a pipeline for interstate transmission. 94 By
the Court's logic, by the time a producer sold its gas to a pipeline, the physical acts associated with production and gathering
were long since over. 9 5 The Court considered the gathering exemption to apply only to purely local concerns such as conservation and the drilling of wells. 96

The bundled services system of gas delivery greatly accelerated expansion of NGA authority over production and gather-

ing.97 Since pipelines provided production and gathering ser-

vices as constituent elements of their interstate sale and
transportation operations, NGA jurisdiction often perfunctorily
extended to a pipeline's entire package of bundled services.9 8
Indeed "when a pipeline applied for a certificate to construct facilities, the [FPC] did not inquire into the pipeline's prospective

90. See Fagan, supra note 1, at 711-13 (categorizing steps of production
according to the physical act required).
91. ExxonMobil Gas Mktg.Co., 297 F.3d at 1076-77.
92. Conoco Inc. v. FERC, 90 F.3d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
93. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FERC, 347 U.S. 672, 677-78, 685 (1954)
(holding that the NGA applies to wellhead prices of gas entering the flow of
interstate commerce).
94. Id. at 685.
95. Id. at 678.
96. See Mich.-Wisc. Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 164 (1954).
97. See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 72 F.E.R.C. 61,219, at 62,002 (Sept.
13, 1995).

98. See id.
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99
use of the facilities before issuing the certificate." Instead, the
certificate simply placed all facilities within NGA jurisdiction
since the pipeline was providing a multifunctional service in
which production and gathering were integrally linked to inter10 0
state sales and transportation.

III. THE DEREGULATORY ERA
Reliance on bundled services and broad extension of NGA
jurisdiction to production and gathering characterized regula10 1
tion of the natural gas industry until the 1970s energy crisis.
When the crisis struck, the price of unregulated intrastate
10 2
Conversely, the FPC was slow
natural gas rose dramatically.
upward in response to ingas
interstate
of
to adjust the price
10 3
to dedicate their sales of
began
Producers
creased demand.
0 4
leading to a severe
markets,
intrastate
gas to higher priced
and promptmarket,
interstate
the
on
gas
shortage of natural
Act of 1978
Policy
Gas
National
the
pass
to
ing Congress
05
(NPGA).'
The NGPA greatly curtailed NGA jurisdiction over production activities, deregulating many wellhead gas prices in an ef10 6
into balance.
fort to bring intrastate and interstate gas prices
The NGPA signaled the beginning of a deregulatory era witnessing the end of bundled services and significant deregula10 7
This section discusses these
tion of gathering facilities.
their effects.
and
changes in regulatory policy

99. Id.
100. Conoco Inc. v. FERC, 90 F.3d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
101. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 9-12. The energy crisis is largely at-

tributed to the confluence of two events: the OPEC oil embargo of 1972-73 and
record-cold winters. Fagan, supra note 1, at 716.
102. Fagan, supranote 1, at 716.
103.

See id.

104. Id.
105. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 1343-46.
106. Fagan, supra note 1, at 716-17. Federal regulation of wellhead prices
ended with the passage of the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989. Id.
at 709-10.
107. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 20-21.
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A. THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
AS A DEREGULATORY FORCE: THE UNBUNDLING OF
NATURAL GAS SERVICES

Though FERC is a "creature of statute," 108 it possesses
great latitude in determining how best to pursue its statutory
ends' 0 9 as long as it does not depart from the Supreme Court's
interpretation of statutory terms.1 1 0 Reviewing courts will overturn FERC's administrative orders only if they are arbitrary or
capricious due to a lack of reasoned decision making."' Reasoned decision making by an administrative agency includes
demonstrating a rational relationship between chosen policies
and their supporting facts.112
The NGPA did not alter the NGA's statutory goals."13
Hence FERC remains charged with regulating the natural gas
industry in the public interest to ensure the availability of gas
at just and reasonable rates.11 4 Toward this end, subsequent to
passage of the NGPA, FERC adopted a formal policy to promote
competition. 1 5 The policy of promoting competition, in the belief that this best serves end users, remains in place today.11 6
To date, FERC's efforts to generate competition include policies

108. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating
that FERC is a "creature of statute" with "no constitutional or common law
existence or authority, but only those authorities conferred upon it by Congress").
109. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)
("[A]dministrative authorities must be permitted, consistently with the obligations of due process, to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.").
110. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131
(1990) (holding that an administrative agency does not have the power to
adopt a policy conflicting with its governing statute and that an agency's interpretation of a statute will be judged against the Court's interpretation).
111. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
112. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); see
also Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1499 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
113. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 12.
114. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
115. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 13-14.
116. According to FERC's Strategic Plan FY 2004-2008, the Commission's
"Goal 2" is to "foster nationwide competitive energy markets as a substitute
for traditional regulation." Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Strategic
Plan FY 2004-2008 (2004), available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs
/strat-plan.asp (last updated July 7, 2004).
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promoting open access to pipeline transportation facilities,
118
and more recently, the unbundling of gas services.

117

1. The Unbundling of Natural Gas Services
FERC Order 636 condemned the traditional bundled ser119
The
vice system of gas delivery to the historical scrap heap.
unduly
services
order-which specifically stated that bundled
0
advantaged pipelines 12 -required pipelines to "unbundle" production, gathering, sales, and transportation services and to offer them as individual products available at separate prices to
any purchaser. 121 By unbundling gas services, FERC intended
to promote competition by allowing sellers independent of pipe22
Morelines to contract directly with LDCs and end users.
yield
would
individually
over, FERC believed pricing services
123
pricing.
bundled
than
signals
more accurate price
Unbundling profoundly affected FERC's prior classification
of gas facilities as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional, particu24
Before unbundling,
larly in regards to gathering facilities.
FERC classified many pipeline-owned gathering facilities as jurisdictional because the facilities were bundled with the pipe-

117. FERC Order 436 initiated the process of opening access to pipeline facilities. See Order 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 42,420-21 (Oct. 18, 1985). Order 436, in
essence, required pipelines to make any of their spare transportation capacity
available to any bidder on a first come first serve basis. See id. This enabled
LDCs to purchase gas directly from an independent producer, transforming
the pipeline into a merchant of common carriage transportation services. See
McArthur, supra note 53, at 18-19. Allowing LDCs to bypass pipelines and
contract directly with producers injected competition into the commodity supply market for natural gas, reducing overall gas prices. See Pierce, supra note
29, at 53.
118. McArthur, supra note 53, at 20.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 20 (citing Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural
Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (Apr. 16,
1992)).
121. Id.
122. See id. (explaining that "FERC intended this 'unbundling' to stimulate
competition... [finding] that bundled services gave pipelines an 'undue' advantage over other sellers and prevented customers from switching from firm
sales to firm transportation").
123. Id.
124. See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (discussing the effect of unbundling on the jurisdictional classification of gathering systems.).
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lines' sales and transportation services. 125 Few reasons existed
for pipelines to challenge these classifications since bundling
blocked independent gatherers from directly offering their services to end users. Unbundling, however, allowed customers to
satisfy their gathering needs either by hiring a pipeline for
gathering or an independent service provider.12 6 This disadvantaged pipelines since their gathering services, previously classified as jurisdictional, remained regulated.127 To prevent unregulated gatherers from undercutting them on price, pipelines
began to pursue strategies for deregulating their own gathering
28
facilities.1
2.

Spinning Down: Pipelines Respond to Unbundling
"Spin downs" became the main strategy employed by pipelines to deregulate their previously jurisdictional gathering facilities. 129 A spin down occurs when a pipeline transfers its
gathering facilities to a wholly owned affiliate. 130 Spinning
down is a two-step process. First, the pipeline petitions FERC
to abandon its gathering facilities by transferring them to an
affiliate.13 ' Second, the affiliate petitions FERC to reclassify the
transferred facilities as nonjurisdictional gathering facilities.132
Independent producers and gatherers argue that allowing
pipelines to deregulate gathering facilities by transferring them
to affiliates potentially enables pipelines to reassert a modicum
of monopolist control.13 3 Specifically, they claim that a spin
down allows pipelines to control access to the main interstate
transportation pipeline, since to reach the mainline, gas must
125. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
126. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 20-21.
127. See id.
128. See Conoco Inc. v. FERC, 90 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (illustrating that pipelines wish to deregulate their gathering facilities to fairly compete with independent gatherers).
129. See, e.g., Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 331 F.3d
1011, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing procedural aspects of a spin down in
determining whether an affiliate's pipelines were subject to FERC's jurisdiction).
130. Id.
131. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FERC, 106 F.3d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir.
1997) (discussing pipeline's abandonment of gathering facilities to a whollyowned subsidiary and subsidiary's corresponding petition to reclassify facilities as exempt from FERC regulation.).
132.

See id.

133. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., Williams Gas Processing-Gulf
Coast Co., 96 F.E.R.C. 61,396, at 61,452 (July 25, 2001).
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often pass through a network of gathering lines, which followowned and operated by the pipeing spin down, are 13exclusively
4
line's own affiliate.
Pipeline gathering affiliates can potentially control access
to the mainline either by setting discriminatory gathering rates
or by giving their parent company's gas preferential treatment
in terms of the order it passes through the gathering lines to
the mainline. 135 FERC's ability to prevent such behavior is constrained because once a gathering facility is spun down, it is no
longer required to file rates with FERC, thus increasing the
prospects of concealing rate discrimination. 136 Such control arguably frustrates FERC's goal of fostering competition by providing open access to interstate pipelines and making unbundled gas services available. 13 7 FERC and the courts, however,
are generally receptive to spinning down.
IV. FERC AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO SPINNING
DOWN
FERC principally cites three rationales as support for
spinning down. First, FERC asserts that the test it uses to determine whether a facility is used for gathering or transportation comports with Supreme Court precedent when the effects
of unbundling and developments in the industry are taken into
account. Second, if the applicable test indicates that a transferred facility engages in gathering, FERC maintains that it
possesses no authority to determine if the pipeline's abandonment of the facility is in the public convenience and necessity.
Third, FERC states that discriminatory acts by pipelines and
their affiliates are adequately restrained by the inclusion of
equal access provisions in spin down approvals and by the
threat of FERC intervention in the event collusive behavior appears. This section describes and analyzes the rationales used
by FERC to support spin down.

134. Id.
135. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 21-22.
136. See id. at 22.
137. See Shell Offshore Inc. v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp, 103 F.E.R.C.
61,177, at 61,672 (May 15, 2003), vacated by 373 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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A. DETERMINING WHETHER A FACILITY ENGAGES IN
GATHERING OR TRANSPORTATION

When FERC receives a petition to classify a facility as engaged in nonjurisdictional gathering, it first considers whether
the facility is owned by an interstate pipeline company. 138 If the
facility is owned by a pipeline, it is with rare exception that

FERC finds it falls within NGA jurisdiction.139 If, however, the
facility is transferred to a wholly owned pipeline affiliate,

FERC generally holds that the facility is nonjurisdictional. 140

FERC's policy of placing pipeline-owned gathering opera-

tions within its jurisdiction, while excluding transferred gathering facilities, stems from changes brought by Order 636.141
Once unbundling occurred, FERC recognized that for pipelines
to offer competitive gathering services they needed "to operate
on a level playing field with ...independent gatherers unregulated by [FERC]."142 FERC did not simply deregulate all gathering because, pursuant to NGA section 4(b), gathering "in
connection with" transportation is jurisdictional.143 Instead,
FERC argued that once transferred to an affiliate, gathering no
longer occurred "in connection with" transportation, and thus
138. See N. Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 929 F.2d 1261, 1269 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a gathering facility owned by an interstate pipeline was properly
classified as jurisdictional).
139. Id. ("[Ilt would be inconsistent to hold that [FERC] may not regulate
rates for transportation over a pipeline's own gathering facilities performed in
connection with admittedly jurisdictional interstate transportation.").
140. Cf. Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 331 F.3d 1011,
1015 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a pipeline gathering facility transferred to
a wholly owned affiliate is nonjurisdictional); ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v.
FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
FERC, 106 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). But see Transcon. Gas
Pipe Line Co., 76 F.E.R.C.
61,317, at 62,542-43 (Sept. 25, 1996) (dismissing
pipeline company's request to transfer gathering facility measuring 3100 miles
in length to wholly owned affiliate).
141. See Conoco, Inc. v. FERC, 90 F.3d 536, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing internal FERC debates on how to adjust gathering jurisdictional issues in light of Order 636).
142. Id.
143. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 106 F.3d at 1196-97. Section 4(b) states that "All
rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural gas company
for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to
the jurisdiction of [FERC] ... shall be just and reasonable .. " 15 U.S.C.
§ 717c(a) (2000) (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit has held that FERC
may regulate gathering facilities owned by pipelines to perform its role of preventing monopolistic trade practices. N. Natural Gas Co., 929 F.2d at 127273.
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the danger of collusion became minimal. 144 Courts warmly support this distinction 145 despite the fact that by their very nature, affiliates are intended to serve the interests of their parent company. 146

FERC does not automatically exempt a transferred gathering facility from its jurisdiction. 147 Prior to issuing a classification, FERC applies what is known as its "primary function test"
to determine whether the facility fits its definition of gathering. 148 The primary function test predominantly relies on a series of physical criteria.' 49 FERC also considers a number of
nonphysical factors, including: (1) a facility's location and purpose, (2) the type of business conducted by the facility owner,
of the NGA requires
and (3) whether meeting the objectives
150
classifying the facility as jurisdictional.
Two trends regarding FERC's application of the primary
function test are particularly notable. First, a 1989 court holding rejected FERC's emphasis on a facility's overall sizespecifically the length of the pipeline-in assessing jurisdiction.' 5 ' FERC's subsequent application of the primary function
test resulted in approval of virtually all petitions for reclassification. 152 This is particularly true of facilities on the Outer

144. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 106 F.3d at 1196-97.
145. See, e.g., id. (noting that whether an affiliate is involved "makes all
the difference"); Conoco Inc., 90 F.3d. at 547 (explaining that FERC does not
have jurisdiction over independent affiliates which do not themselves transport gas in interstate commerce).
146.

See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS

338-42 (2002).
147. See, e.g., Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 331 F.3d
1011, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying primary function test).
148. Id.
149. ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (describing the primary function test).
The "primary function" test generally employs the following six physical criteria: (1) the length and diameters of the lines; (2) the extension
of the facility beyond the central point in the field; (3) the geographic
configuration of the facility; (4) the location of compressors and processing plants; (5) the location of wells along all or part of the line facility; and (6) the operating pressure of the lines.
Id.
150. Id.
151. EP Operating Co. v. FERC, 876 F.2d 46, 48-50 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that FERC's refusal to classify a facility as gathering was unreasonable
because of over reliance on the length of the facility's pipeline).
152. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 22-23.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:537

Continental Shelf (OCS).153 Reasoning that the physical reali-

ties of gas gathering offshore require larger gathering facilities,
FERC began distinguishing gathering from transportation
based in part on "the centralized aggregation point." 154 Under

this standard, the line between gathering and transmission lies
at the point where two or more segments of an OCS pipeline
join for the last time, and a single line moves natural gas toward shore. 155 The centralized aggregation point standard arguably expands gathering well beyond "the physical acts of
drawing the gas from the earth and preparing it for the first
stages of distribution."' 15 6 Nevertheless, the standard received
court approval on the grounds that it fell within a "zone of reasonableness" in light of physical realities on the OCS and
FERC's policy of unbundling. 157
Second, though nonphysical factors have always received
secondary consideration in assessing facilities for jurisdiction,
FERC has lately afforded them less weight in its analysis. 158
FERC's reluctance to consider nonphysical factors draws support from a Fifth Circuit decision reprimanding FERC for overrelying on factors such as the ownership status of a gathering
facility applying for reclassification. 159 At least in cases where a
pipeline owns the gathering facility seeking reclassification,
however, courts have held that nonphysical factors can be central to a decision of whether to exempt a pipeline from jurisdiction. 160

153. See, e.g., Williams Gas Processing-GulfCoast Co., 331 F.3d at 101316 (upholding FERC's approval of transfer of gathering facility from jurisdictional pipeline to nonjurisdictional wholly owned affiliate).
154. See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co., 297 F.3d at 1080-81 (discussing the
centralized aggregation point test).
155. See Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 87 F.E.R.C. 61,384, at 62,425-28 (June
30, 1999).
156. N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 90 (1963).
157. See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co., 297 F.3d at 1084-87 (affirming
FERC's use of the central aggregation point test for offshore facilities).
158. See id. (affirming FERC's decision to allot nonphysical factors only
secondary importance in assessing whether to approve a spin down proposal).
159. Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 127 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1997)
(faulting FERC for over-relying on nonphysical considerations).
160. See generally Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (upholding FERC's refusal to exempt gathering facility largely on the
grounds that it was owned by an interstate pipeline company).
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1. FERC's Method of Classifying Facilities as Gathering or
Transportation Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent and
Undervalues Nonphysical Factors
To date, evidence suggests that unbundling has led to an
overall reduction in gas rates. 16 1 Not all consumers or markets,
however, have benefited. 16 2 The lack of reduced rates within
certain markets may, in part, stem from FERC's response to
spin downs. 163 By liberalizing its primary function test, FERC
created a broad gathering classification, ensuring the success of
the vast majority of spin down plans. 64 While FERC may believe this policy promotes competition, and is thus consistent
with its unbundling objectives, it nevertheless conflicts with
the Supreme Court's narrow definition of gathering. 165 Moreover, FERC's winsome views concerning the prospect for abuse
between pipelines and their gathering affiliates-characterized
by its lack of emphasis on nonphysical factors when applying
the primary function test-potentially enable pipelines to reassert a semblance of monopoly control within given markets,
specifically those where166limited competitive alternatives are
available to purchasers.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Commission specifically holds that NGA section 1(b)'s production and gathering
exemptions are "narrowly confined to the physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth and preparing it for the first stages
of distribution." 167 While Congress has ended the extension of
section 1(b) authority to wellhead prices, 6 8 no Supreme Court
decision or congressional act directly modifies the Court's holding in Northern Natural Gas Co.

161. See GREG PALAST ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND REGULATION: HOW THE
PUBLIC CAN GOVERN ESSENTIAL SERVICES 143 (2003).

162. See id. (noting that industrial users have benefited the most from
FERC regulatory policy between 1982 and 2000 while residential consumers
have seen the fewest cost benefits).
163. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 60-61.
164. See id. at 20, 26.
165. See N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 90 (1963)
(laying out the Court's narrow definition of gathering).
166. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 60-61 (noting that in an area where
there is a single gatherer, spin down is more likely to result in discriminatory
rates).
167. N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 90.
168. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Petitions for spin down since the early 1990s demonstrate
FERC's inclination to liberalize the primary function test, thus
expanding the definition of acts that constitute gathering. 169
Reliance on the centralized aggregation point for classifying
offshore facilities, in particular, pushes the envelope. 170 The
aggregation of gas from various wells at a central point where
it will enter the mainline bears little relationship to a physical
act intended to prepare gas for the first stages of distribution. 17 1 Almost by definition, once gas arrives at the mainlinea journey often traversing hundreds of miles-its lifecycle has
already progressed beyond initial distributive acts.
The absence of a relationship between a centralized aggregation point and Northern Natural Gas Co.'s holding featured
prominently in an opinion dissenting from the D.C. Circuit's
approval of the centralized aggregation point test:
FERC has thus asked this court to validate a determination that
'gathering' ends where two large lines become one and grow disproportionately wider as a result. This proposition is perplexing on its
own terms, and it is unlawful in light of what we have been told by
the Supreme Court in Northern Natural Gas Co., namely that production and gathering entail only the 'physical acts of drawing gas from
the earth and preparing it for the first stages of distribution.'172

In addition to conflicting with the principle that Supreme
Court interpretations of statutory terms are controlling,
FERC's liberalization of the primary function test potentially
allows pipelines to assert excessive control over gathering services and to restrict access to their transportation facilities, in
direct contradiction of FERC's own agency objectives.1 73 This
danger is compounded by FERC's willingness to allow pipelines
to avoid regulation by transferring their gathering facilities to
wholly owned affiliates.174
FERC maintains a somewhat curious policy regarding affiliate transfers. While it insists that it can assert jurisdiction
over gathering facilities directly owned by pipelines, FERC
rather quickly washes its hands of regulatory responsibility

169. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
170. See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1080-81 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
171. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
172. ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co., 297 F.3d at 1093 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
173. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 331 F.3d
1011, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (demonstrating FERC's amenability to approving
pipelines' transference of their gathering facilities to their affiliates).
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once a pipeline transfers gathering facilities to a wholly owned
affiliate. 175 FERC maintains a hands-off approach to affiliates
exist primarily to benefit their parent
despite the fact that they
176
company's bottom line.
FERC further compounds this danger by according nonphysical factors only secondary consideration when reviewing a
petition for transfer. 177 Since courts generally hold that nonphysical factors are less significant than physical ones, FERC
178
Yet by proruns no risk of contradicting judicial precedent.
than physiweight
less
significantly
factors
nonphysical
viding
more
potentially
climate
a
regulatory
creates
FERC
cal ones,
discriminatory
curtailing,
than
rather
promoting,
to
conducive
behavior.
Two of the most important nonphysical factors in terms of
potentially controlling pipeline-affiliate abuses are: (1) the purpose, location, and operation of a facility; and (2) the general
179
If a pipeline is the sole
business activity of the transferor.
and concurrently the
market
transporter of gas to a particular
dangers of monopthe
field,
particular
a
sole gatherer of gas in
80
to spin down
petitioned
pipeline
a
If
such
oly abuse increase.
the
standards
current
FERC's
under
its gathering facilities,
receive
would
facilities
gathering
the
of
physical characteristics
8
primary consideration in the evaluative process.' ' FERC
would de-emphasize nonphysical evidence pointing to monopoly
potential in the absence of regulation.
It is reasonable for pipelines to seek a level playing field
and for FERC to address their concerns. A regulatory scheme
favoring one competitor over another would arguably defeat
FERC's goal of injecting robust competition into the natural gas
industry. Yet the danger also exists of tilting the scales too favorably toward pipelines in FERC's efforts to balance competitive reforms with pipeline interests. FERC's liberalization of its
primary function test, lack of attention to potential parent-

175. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
178. See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1080 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
179. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
180. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 60-61 (noting that in an area where
there is a single gatherer, spin down is more likely to result in discriminatory
rates).
181. Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 127 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1997).
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affiliate abuses, and de-emphasis of nonphysical factors may
combine to place pipelines in the precise position of advantage
the NGA was designed to prevent.
B. FERC AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT ABANDONMENT SERVE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Prior to any abandonment of a jurisdictional facility, the
NGA requires a petitioner to obtain a certificate from FERC
stating that abandonment is consistent with the public convenience and necessity. 182 The burden of demonstrating that abandonment serves the public interest rests with the petitioner. 18 3
In a public interest analysis relative to abandonment, FERC
chiefly considers whether or not cessation of a jurisdictional activity will result in anticompetitive practices that adversely affect the public.184
In seeming contradiction of the NGA, FERC does not conduct public interest analysis prior to approving transfers from a
parent company to an affiliate. 185 FERC argues that a public
interest analysis need not occur in such cases for two related
reasons. First, FERC states that it lacks jurisdiction to conduct
a public interest analysis if the transferred facility qualifies as
gathering under the primary function test. 186 Second, FERC
argues that transferred facilities are not being abandoned
within the meaning of section 7(b) of the NGA.187 Instead, the
facilities are simply being transferred to another entity who
will continue operations as before.l 88
Interestingly, in light of its recent emphasis on promoting
competition, 8 9 FERC suggests that even if a public interest
182. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
183. See supranotes 74-77 and accompanying text.
184. See supranotes 74-77 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Williams Gas Processing--Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 331 F.3d
1011, 1021-22 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming FERC's policy of not conducting a
public interest analysis when it finds that the facilities a pipeline is seeking to
transfer are engaged in gathering).
186. Id. at 1022 ("[O]nce FERC determines that a facility is not dedicated
to a jurisdictional function, it has no authority to exercise jurisdiction over
that facility by denying the certificate of abandonment for that facility.").
187. See ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1088 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
188. Id. (holding that section 7(b) cannot be used to "bootstrap" FERC jurisdiction over gathering facilities the petitioner sought to transfer and reclassify).
189. See supranotes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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analysis were necessary, no specific showing that competition
190
FERC believes
would flow from reclassification is required.
relevant to
particularly
not
is
that "the existence of competition
To
facilities.
gathering
a decision to allow a pipeline to abandon
required
effort
excessive
the
the extent competition is relevant,
to assess it would be unwarranted ... ,"191 Instead, FERC relies
on its belief that reclassification, combined with unbundling,
"should, in the long run, promote competition within the gath192
ering industry."
A circuit court split exists as to whether or not FERC must
conduct a public interest analysis prior to reclassifying a transferred facility. The D.C. Circuit backs FERC, holding that
FERC possesses no NGA authority "to deny abandonment
of... facilities that it found were primarily functioning as
gathering." 193 In support of its position, the D.C. Circuit holds
that the NGA's section 1(b) exemption for gathering subsumes
language in section 4-suggesting that gathering in connection
section 7is jurisdictional-and
with transportation
as
reclassified
be
suggesting that a jurisdictional facility cannot
94
analysis.
interest
public
a
gathering without
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit holds that the NGA requires
a public interest analysis prior to approval of any abandonment
"that permanently reduces a significant portion of a particular
95
The Fifth Circuit
service dedicated to interstate markets."'
190. See Williams Gas Processing-GulfCoast Co., 331 F.3d at 1022.
191. McArthur, supra note 53, at 26 (quoting Mid-La. Gas Co., 67 F.E.R.C.
61,255, at 61,851 (May 27, 1994)).
192. Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co., 331 F.3d at 1022 (quoting
N. Natural Gas Co., 93 F.E.R.C. 61,101, at 61,273 (Oct. 27, 2000)). FERC's
position is supported by the D.C. Circuit. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Conoco, Inc. v. FERC, 90 F.3d 536, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Sections 4, 5 and 7 do not concern the producing or gathering of natural gas; rather, they have reference to the interstate sale and transportation of gas and are so limited by their express terms. Thus §§
4(a), (b), (c), 5(a) and 7(c) speak of "transportation or sale of natural
gas subject to the jurisdiction of [FERC]" while § 7(a) and (b) refer respectively to "transportation facilities" and "facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of [FERCI." Nothing in the sections indicates that the
power given to [FERCI over natural-gas companies by § 1(b) could
have been intended to swallow all the exceptions of the same section
and thus extend the power of [FERC] to the constitutional limit of
congressional authority over commerce.
Id. at 552 (quoting FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 508-09
(1949)).
195. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 106 F.3d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 652 F.2d

562
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specifically holds that a public interest analysis must be conducted regardless of whether or not a facility is being transferred to a nonjurisdictional entity.196 This strict reading of the
statute, allowing very limited exceptions, draws support from a
Supreme Court holding that section 7(b) allows no exceptions to
197
statutory procedure.
1. FERC Should Conduct a Public Interest Analysis Prior to
Approving Proposed Spin Downs
To meet its statutory goals of providing just and reasonable
rates and reliable service, the NGA requires that any gas company seeking to abandon any jurisdictional facility must first
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from
FERC.198 FERC's current approach to spin down sidesteps the
NGA's public interest requirements by means of semantic hairsplitting, thus ignoring valid legal and policy arguments supporting use of public interest analysis. Ironically, FERC's reluctance to conduct a public interest analysis prior to approving a
spin down threatens to undermine the Commission's own procompetitive reforms.
Since unbundling set the need for spin down in motion, 199
FERC appears almost averse to conducting public interest
analysis of proposed transfers and abandonment.20 FERC puts
the cart before the horse when arguing it lacks jurisdiction to
conduct a public interest analysis of transferred facilities independently qualifying as nonjurisdictional.201 Under FERC's approach, a jurisdictional pipeline-owned gathering facility can
become nonjurisdictional immediately upon transfer, entirely
sidestepping section 7(b) requirements. 20 2 Such maneuvers,
while perhaps well-intentioned methods of allowing pipelines to
compete fairly with independent gatherers, are akin to using
procedural devices to defeat the intent of substantive law.
While FERC's actions are within legal bounds, one might justifiably hope for more allegiance to public interest analysis from
503, 511 (5th Cir. 1981)).
196. Id. ("As we read the statute, it makes no difference who gets the facilities or, indeed, whether anyone gets them at all .... ").
197. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529, 536 (1979).
198. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
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an agency charged with regulating an industry affected with
the public interest.203
Considering the conflicting circuit court precedents, FERC
possesses the latitude, but perhaps not the inclination, to more
aggressively apply public interest analysis to transfer requests.2 04 Indeed, valid legal and policy arguments suggest
transfer petitioners should be required to demonstrate that
their request comports with the public interest. Legal support
for applying public interest analysis to transfer and abandonment requests flows directly from section 7(b), which states
that any abandonment of a jurisdictional facility requires a certificate of public convenience and necessity.2 0 5 Reinforcing the
strict application of section 7(b)'s abandonment requirements,
the Supreme Court allows for no exceptions to section 7(b)'s
20 6
prescribed statutory procedures.
In response, FERC argues that section 7(b) does not apply
to spin down cases since facilities are not being abandoned, but
rather transferred to another operator. 20 7 But this belies the
reality that transfer enables a previously jurisdictional facility
to gain nonjurisdictional status without first obtaining a certificate, thus procedurally circumventing section 7(b). Moreover, FERC's position is somewhat self-contradictory. FERC essentially states that they will exempt jurisdictional facilities
dedicated to serving interstate markets even though those facilities, by FERC's own admission, will continue to perform exactly the same operations for exactly the same markets. Semantic distinction between transfer and abandonment should
not suffice to profoundly undercut the intended statutory reach
of section 7(b).
From a policy standpoint, FERC undermines its own procompetition agenda by not requiring a localized showing of
competition before permitting transfer.2 0 8 FERC's faith in competition over the long run ignores the reality that monopoly
abuses most easily flourish in markets lacking competitive al203. See PALAST, supra note 161, at 81-87.
204. See supra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (2000) ("No natural-gas company shall abandon all
or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission... without... a finding by the Commission... that the present or future
public convenience or necessity permit[s] such abandonment.").
206. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529, 536 (1979).
207. See, e.g., ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
208. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
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ternatives. 209 By not examining the degree of gathering and
transportation competition existing in markets where a pipeline spins down, FERC runs the risk of allowing pipelines to
assert monopoly control over those markets. 2 10 The dangers of
pipelines attaining new unregulated monopolies are magnified
by the fact that the states impose few, if any, regulations on intrastate gathering. For example, in the four largest natural gas
producing states-Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas-there are no state requirements that gatherers file rates
and no regulation of gathering prices. 2 11 Moreover, technological developments have not undermined the advantages of large
economies of scale within the natural gas industry.212 Thus, es-

tablished companies, if given the opportunity through lack of
regulatory oversight, retain the ability to price competitors out
of business, consolidating their own power and potentially leading to market abuses. 21 3
C. FERC's PROVISION OF EQUAL ACCESS AND ABILITY TO
REASSERT JURISDICTION

FERC further supports its position regarding transfers by
asserting that when approving spin downs it requires open access provisions and reserves the right to reassert jurisdiction if
evidence of collusive behavior appears. 2 14 Equal access provisions are generally de rigueur in the granting of a spin down
petition. These provisions are intended to ensure that independent producers and gatherers will continue receiving fair
treatment by a pipeline's affiliated gatherer following transfer. 215 By requiring equal access nondiscrimination provisions,
FERC argues that the risk of discriminatory behavior is sufficiently mitigated. 216
In the event discrimination arises, FERC maintains the
ability to reassert jurisdiction over the transferred facility, dis209. See McArthur, supra note 53, at 60-61.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 7-9. Because slow technological change characterizes the
natural gas industry and the capital costs of entering the business remain
high, the danger of natural monopoly remains salient in the gas industry. See
id. For a brief summary of natural monopoly and countervailing theories, see
supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
214. See Conoco, Inc. v. FERC, 90 F.3d 536, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
215. See id.
216. See id.
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2 17
In arregarding the affiliate's separate corporate structure.
acFERC
jurisdiction,
reasserting
on
ticulating its position
2 18 According to
exists.
abuse
for
knowledges that potential
FERC, "[w]hereas an affiliated gatherer acting in concert with
its affiliated interstate pipeline has an incentive to maximize
no
profits for the corporate parent, an unaffiliated gatherer has
219 Nevertheless, FERC believes the mere posuch incentive."
of
tential for affiliate abuse does not require traditional forms
220 Instead, FERC will "only regulate... pipeline afregulation.
filiates if shown [by complaint] that more extensive ...regulation is necessary to invalidate an unjust and unreasonable rate
or to correct an unduly discriminatory practice ... ,"221 Consequently, absent an a priori showing of undue discrimination,
not required to file rates or conditions of
affiliate gatherers are
222
FERC.
with
service

1. Successful and Effective Reassertion of Jurisdiction
Requires Access to Information on Rates and Conditions
of Service
purchasOpen access promotes competition by increasing 223
Incluing options and exerting downward pressure on price.
relikely
downs
sion of open access provisions in approved spin
224
the
At
duces the risk of discriminatory actions by pipelines.
very least, open access requirements provide independents with
an actionable claim should they be barred from accessing a
pipeline's facilities. Similarly, FERC's assurances that they will
reassert jurisdiction where violations occur likely deters some
unsavory trade practices. Yet for both open access and the
threat of intervention to truly succeed, it is critical that relevant data be available to potentially aggrieved parties.
Knowing when an actionable claim arises, and assembling
the data needed to prove it to FERC's satisfaction, depends
where
217. Id. The D.C. Circuit holds that FERC can reassert jurisdiction
evidence of collusion is shown. Id.
218. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp, 103 F.E.R.C.

Cir. 2004).
61,177, at 61,667 (May 15, 2003) vacated by 373 F.3d 1335 (D.C.
Id.
219.
Pipelines
220. Natural Gas Gathering Services Performed by Interstate
and
Terms
and
Rates
to
Related
Affiliates-Issues
and Interstate Pipeline
1993).
Conditions of Service, 65 F.E.R.C. 61,136, at 61,690 (Oct. 28,
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
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heavily on access to information.225 Without informational
transparency, it is difficult for an aggrieved party to even know
for certain they are being discriminated against. 226 Public access to pricing and service information remains one of the
unique features of American public utility regulation. 227 It is
arguable that such access rights in and of themselves contribute to the achievement of just and reasonable rates. 228 Though
impossible to prevent data concealment, operating in a glass
bowl constrains a company's ability to set unreasonable
229
rates.
Section 19 of the NGA allows any aggrieved person to appeal FERC orders. 230 To do so successfully, however, requires
access to relevant information.231 FERC's position that transferred facilities need not file rate or service information impedes the ability of consumers to challenge both FERC orders
and pipeline practices. 232 Pipelines possess incentives to conceal financial data regarding rates and profits. 233 Lack of filing
requirements impedes the flow of information needed to reveal
and curtail abuses. Ironically, free access to information is a
hallmark of competitive markets. 234 By allowing pipelines to
suspend filings upon transfer, FERC threatens the growth of
competition by endangering open access and inhibiting the ability of aggrieved parties to successfully petition FERC for redress.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Most commentators view FERC's policies of open access
and unbundling favorably.235 Certainly regulation of the industry required reform following the abysmal performance of the
interstate gas market during the mid-1970s.236 Competition,

225. McArthur, supra note 53, at 86.
226. Id. at 87.
227. See PALAST, supra note 161, at 15-27.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. 15 U.S.C § 717r(a) (2000).
231. McArthur, supra note 53, at 86-88.
232. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (noting that
FERC
does not require affiliate gatherers to file rates).
233. McArthur, supra note 53, at 87.
234. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 13, at 28.
235. See id. at 287; McArthur, supra note 53, at 88.
236. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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however, must be viewed as a practical task-oriented objective,
not a theoretical panacea. Deregulatory policies can lead to new
inefficiencies or generate new opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. 23 7 For example, even though gas prices have generally
fallen since FERC embarked on its deregulatory course, resi2 38 Similarly,
dential users have seen their rates increase.
FERC's policies regarding spin down and the regulation of
opportunities to
gathering facilities present pipelines with new 239
exert monopoly control of discrete gas markets. FERC's proclamation-based on theoretical faith-that gathering competi240 provides little comfort in
tion will flourish in the long run
light of current realities.
Nevertheless, a legitimate argument exists that pipelines
deserve a fair opportunity to compete in the unbundled gathering industry. 24 1 A level playing field cannot exist where pipelines must file gathering rates and terms of service while inde-

242
FERC attempts to counteractpendent gatherers need not.

this inequity by allowing pipelines to avoid regulation through

spin down. 24 3 Yet FERC's liberal acceptance of spin down with-

out a showing that it is in the public interest may give pipelines
an unfair advantage rather than simply placing them on equal
2 44
regulatory footing with their independent counterparts.
Three policy proposals would help to achieve a more proper
balance.
First, a public interest analysis should be required prior to
approval of any spin down. As a general rule, regulated firms
should not be able to unilaterally avoid statutory will by disassembling themselves into smaller entities beyond an agency's
jurisdiction. Because independent gatherers might undercut a
pipeline while its petition is pending, a pipeline that makes out
be
an initial prima facie case that their petition is valid should
245
pending.
is
petition
the
while
rates
filing
excused from
237. See supra text accompanying note 166.
238. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
239. See supra text accompanying note 166.
240. Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 331,F.3d 1011,
1022 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
241. See Conoco, Inc. v. FERC, 90 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
242. See id.
243. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
244. See Williams Gas Processing-GulfCoast Co., 331 F.3d at 1021-22.
245. Rate information for this period, however, should be maintained so
that if the pipeline's petition is rejected FERC will have access to the withheld
data.
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Second, each public interest analysis should include review
of competitive conditions in the market where spin down is
proposed. Whether or not gathering and transportation alternatives are available within a given market provides insight
into the prospect of pipeline abuses. 246 The burden of showing
that local competition will not suffer upon transfer, and that
transfer will not create captive customers without regulatory
protection, must rest with the petitioner. Competition in a local
market-long term or short term-cannot be assumed into existence by fiat.
A proper consideration of competitive conditions must necessarily heighten emphasis on nonphysical factors such as facility purpose and location and the general business activity of
the transferor. 247 This is not to say that nonphysical factors
should receive more weight than physical ones, but rather to
suggest that they bear more consideration when transfer to an
affiliate is proposed. If sold to a truly independent entity, the
importance of nonphysical factors would correspondingly diminish.
Finally, and most problematically, rates and conditions of
service for all gathering activities should be publicly avail248
able.

This does not necessitate the regulatory setting of rates

and terms of service, but merely their public reporting. Transparency of pricing and service conditions fits neatly with
FERC's procompetitive agenda. Indeed, "competitive markets
thrive on information, which is a necessary ingredient of price
competition."' 24 9 Making rates and service conditions publicly
known would arm consumers with the information they need to
assemble the most cost effective package of unbundled services. 250 Additionally, with pipelines and independent gatherers
required to publicize their rates, the dangers of regulatory arbitrage would likely abate.
Realizing publicly available gathering rates, however, is no
easy matter. Local gathering lies beyond FERC's jurisdiction251
246. See Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 127 F.3d 365, 377 (5th Cir. 1997).
247. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
249. McArthur, supra note 53, at 88 ("Free markets give consumers alternatives and let them make informed choices. Competitive markets drive out
excess profits, but protect producers from illegal undercutting because companies that price below competitive levels will lose money and go out of business.").
250. See id.
251. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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and states seem little inclined to fill the gap. 25 2 Thus transpar-

ent gathering rates and service conditions are not likely to be
achieved, at least in the short term. For now, a robust public
interest analysis prior to spin down must suffice. Yet if the
move toward increasingly competitive gas markets proceeds,
the ideal of transparency must remain in sight.
CONCLUSION
The NGA was passed to protect purchasers of natural gas
253
from monopolist practices by interstate pipeline companies.
Providing natural gas at just and reasonable rates remains the
paramount goal of the NGA.254 Until the deregulatory era

commenced by the NGPA, regulators sought to achieve just and
reasonable rates by permitting pipelines to operate monopolies
so long as they submitted to considerable regulatory oversight.2 55 The procompetitive era, characterized by open access
and unbundling, profoundly altered the existing regulatory
landscape. 256 Unbundling forced pipelines to compete with independent operators for business within discrete segments of
257
the gas industry.
When pipelines began to respond to unbundling by spinning down jurisdictional gathering facilities, they received
strong support from FERC, which required no showing that
spin down benefited consumers by encouraging competition,
and conducted no public interest analysis prior to approving
spin down petitions. As a result, pipelines, particularly those in
areas where little competition exists in the gathering industry,
obtained an opportunity to reassert market dominance in certain markets. Such an outcome directly contradicts the objectives of FERC's procompetitive unbundling reforms. To ensure
that consumers continue to receive access to natural gas at just
and reasonable rates, FERC must reformulate its response to
spin down by conducting a public interest analysis and promoting informational transparency in the natural gas industry.

252. See
253. See
254. See
Cir. 2002).
255. See
256. See
257. See

supra note 211 and accompanying text.
supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (D.C.
supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.

